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Abstract
Recent advances in information and communication technologies have made
the development and operation of complex disease surveillance systems tech-
nically feasible, and many systems have been proposed to interpret diverse
data sources for health-related signals. Implementing these systems for daily
use and efficiently interpreting their output, however, remains a technical
challenge.
This thesis presents a method for understanding disease surveillance sys-
tems structurally, examines four existing systems, and discusses the implica-
tions of developing such systems. The discussion is followed by two papers.
The first paper describes the design of a national outbreak detection system
for daily disease surveillance. It is currently in use at the Swedish Institute
for Communicable Disease Control. The source code has been licenced under
GNU v3 and is freely available. The second paper discusses methodological
issues in computational epidemiology, and presents the lessons learned from
a software development project in which a spatially explicit micro-meso-
macro model for the entire Swedish population was built based on registry
data.
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Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Introduction
Surveillance is the act of monitoring and interpreting the activities of an
object of interest. Disease surveillance is an epidemiological practise where
the object of interest is defined to be a disease. Monitoring the disease host,
or populations of potential disease hosts is implicit in the surveillance act;
the disease cannot exist without the host. The potential and the immediate
hosts are monitored for predefined signs, and the signs are interpreted in an
attempt to prevent or minimise the spread of the disease. Disease surveil-
lance is performed for both communicable diseases (influenza, chlamydia,
salmonella, etc.) and non-communicable diseases (asthma, cancer, diabetes,
etc.). The surveillance of the former is called infectious disease surveillance,
and it most often involves analysing case reports or lab reports filed after
doctors’ visits. The lab verified results are often used as highly accurate
indicators of the disease, but the delay between the onset of symptoms and
the verification of the diagnosis may be several days to weeks depending on
the disease, the diagnosis and the local infrastructure available to the prac-
titioners. To reduce the delay, data originally collected for other purposes
have been proposed as additional indicators to aid the understanding of in-
fectious diseases. This approach is called syndromic surveillance, and its
practitioners collect and analyse data from different data sources including
pre-diagnostic case reports, number of hospital visits, over-the-counter drug
sales and web search queries, among many other sources.
One of the most comprehensive and influential definitions of syndromic
surveillance was given by the United States Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC):
Syndromic surveillance for early outbreak detection is an in-
vestigational approach where health department staff, assisted
by automated data acquisition and generation of statistical sig-
nals, monitor disease indicators continually (real-time) or at least
1
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daily (near real-time) to detect outbreaks of diseases earlier and
more completely than might otherwise be possible with tradi-
tional public health methods (e.g., by reportable disease surveil-
lance and telephone consultation). The distinguishing charac-
teristic of syndromic surveillance is the use of indicator data
types. (Buehler et al. 2004, p.2)
Practitioners have criticised the usage of syndromic surveillance as im-
precise and misleading, because many of the systems described by the term
do not actually monitor syndromes, the association of signs and symp-
toms often observed together, but other non-health related data sources
such as over-the-counter medication or ambulance dispatches (Mostashari
2003, Henning 2004). Despite its shortcomings, the term remains the most
widely recognised among the alternatives. Other terms that describe simi-
lar or equivalent activities include early warning systems, prodrome surveil-
lance, pre-diagnostic surveillance, outbreak detection systems, information
system-based sentinel surveillance, biosurveillance systems, health indicator
surveillance, nontraditional surveillance, and symptom-based surveillance.
Some developers of syndromic surveillance systems have argued for broader
terms, such as biosurveillance, to describe their work, in an attempt to unify
outbreak detection and outbreak characterisation, claiming that epidemiol-
ogists may consider outbreak characterisation to be separate from public
health surveillance (Wagner et al. 2006, p.3).
The unifying property of complex disease surveillance systems as infor-
mation and communication systems is that they are designed to function
without human intervention, performing statistical analyses at regular in-
tervals to discover aberrant signals that match the parameters set by their
operators. Recent advances in information and communication technology
(ICT) have made the development and operation of such systems techni-
cally feasible, and many systems have been proposed to interpret multiple
data sources, including those containing non-health related information, for
disease surveillance. The introduction of these systems to the public health
infrastructure has been accompanied by significant criticism regarding the
diverting of resources from public health programs to the development of
the systems (Sidel et al. 2002, Dowling & Lipton 2005), the challenges of
investigating the alerts raised by the systems (Mostashari 2003), and the
claims of rapid detection (Reingold 2003, Berger et al. 2006).
The motivation behind developing complex ICT systems for disease
surveillance can be partially explained by the observation that epidemiolo-
gists tasked with monitoring communicable diseases are expected to main-
tain an awareness of multiple databases during their daily work. To provide
the experts with a rapid overview of all available data, and to equip them
with additional information to make decisions, development of ICT systems
are proposed. Efficiently interpreting the combined output of these systems,
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however, remains a technical challenge. In many cases, the populations rep-
resented in the data sources monitored by the systems differ significantly,
preventing the application of traditional statistical methods to analyse the
collected data. In theory, syndromic surveillance complements traditional
disease surveillance in order to increase the sensitivity and specificity of
outbreak detection and public health surveillance efforts. However, the syn-
tactic and semantic diversity of the syndromic data sources complicates such
efforts.
More importantly, the development of new methods of disease surveil-
lance closely mirrors ongoing discussions in public health policy. The pri-
mary focus of syndromic surveillance on the unspecified and unexpected
events challenges the traditional goals of public health. The goal of in-
creasing the health of the populations through interventions against known
events, improbable as they may be, is challenged by the mandate of pre-
paredness, of defending against unknown or underspecified threats. To in-
fluence the direction of future research, discussing the implications of devel-
oping complex disease surveillance systems is of utmost importance today,
while the field of syndromic surveillance is still in its infancy.
1.2 Disposition
The rest of chapter 1 describes the state-of-the-art in disease surveillance sys-
tems in more detail, presents a structural analysis of such systems, examines
four existing implementations, and discusses the implications of developing
and operating disease surveillance systems.
Chapter 2 includes two papers. The first, Cakici et al. (2010), describes
the design of a national outbreak detection system inspired by syndromic
surveillance systems. The system has been developed for daily communi-
cable disease surveillance: the diagnoses monitored by the system are pre-
defined, and the only data source used in detection is the communicable
disease case database SmiNet (Rolfhamre et al. 2006). The system can per-
form different types of statistical analyses based on the users’ preferences,
and it regularly runs the requested analyses with the provided parameters.
It is in use at the Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control.
The second paper, A workflow for software development within com-
putational epidemiology (under review, Journal of Computational Science),
discusses methodological issues in computational epidemiology, and presents
the lessons learned from a software development project of more than 100
person months. The project is a spatially explicit micro-meso-macro model
for the entire Swedish population built on registry data, thus far used for
smallpox and for influenza-like illnesses. The list of lessons learned is in-
tended for use by computational epidemiologists and policy makers, and the
workflow incorporating these two roles is described in detail.
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1.3 State-of-the-art
Considering the extensive history of public health literature, the develop-
ment of complex information systems for disease surveillance is a recent
addition. The first systems that proposed to monitor non-health related
data sources for indicators of public health appeared in late 1990s (Heffer-
nan et al. 2004a), and the development of larger systems began after 2001,
most of them in the United States (Sosin & DeThomasis 2004). The last ten
years have seen the development of a surprisingly large number of systems
with diverse functionality. Out of this multitude, four systems were chosen
in this work to highlight four corresponding directions taken by developers
of disease surveillance systems:
• Integrating data collected from many institutions tasked with public
health response to provide an overview of events concerning public
health at the national level. BioSense, one of the largest syndromic
systems ever deployed, accomplishes this by combining the data from
diverse health facilities in 26 US states (Bradley et al. 2005).
• Understanding signals in many public health data sources in relation
to each other, during the collection process, at the institute tasked
with collection. RODS achieves this task by providing a self-contained
system that can be deployed independently at multiple public health
facilities (Tsui et al. 2003).
• Structuring the collected data and the methods of analysis in order to
ease the difficulty of adding new sources or methods to existing sys-
tems. BioStorm provides ontologies that can classify analysis methods
based on the goal of the analysis. It matches available data sources
with suitable analysis methods (O’Connor et al. 2003).
• Increasing the visibility of results of disease surveillance analyses. The
web-based HealthMap is accessible over the Internet without any ad-
ditional authentication (Freifeld et al. 2008).
These systems are described further in section 1.5 below. The four prop-
erties of the examined systems are absent in traditional disease surveillance
systems; they represent new contributions to the field, coinciding with the
introduction of syndromic surveillance systems to public health practise.
However, as the importance of ICT in disease surveillance increases, the
boundary between syndromic and traditional non-syndromic surveillance
blurs further. Systems designed for monitoring non-health related indicators
grow to include diagnostic information, and systems for traditional disease
surveillance begin to incorporate non-health related data sources.
Syndromic surveillance literature published in English is dominated by
systems developed in and intended to be deployed in the United States, with
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a few exceptions (Josseran et al. 2006, van den Wijngaard et al. 2011). More
systems, developed in European states have been documented in the broader
field of disease surveillance and outbreak detection (Hulth et al. 2010). Ad-
ditionally, the European Commission has sponsored several large projects
on Europe-wide systems for awareness and monitoring of pandemics, but
the scope has been very wide and the software output has been modest;
see, e.g., the INFTRANS (Transmission modelling and risk assessment for
released or newly emergent infectious disease agents) project on the sixth
framework programme, 2002–2006 (European Commission 2008).
1.4 Constituents of disease surveillance systems
Conceptually, disease surveillance systems may be partitioned into collec-
tion, analysis, and notification. The collection component contains lists of
available data sources, collection strategies for data sources, instructions for
formatting the collected data, and storage solutions. The analysis compo-
nent stores a wide variety of computational methods used to extract signifi-
cant signals from the collected data. The final component, notification, con-
tains the procedures for communicating analysis results to interested parties.
The results may be presented in many forms: numerical output from statisti-
cal analysis, incident plots displaying exceeded thresholds, maps coloured to
indicate different levels of observed activity, or simply as messages advising
the experts to check a data source for further information.
1.4.1 Collection
The set of accessible data sources is the most important factor in determin-
ing the capabilities of a disease surveillance system. Once again, following
the growth of syndromic surveillance, a wide variety of sources have been
proposed for monitoring. They may be divided into three groups based
on when they become visible to the system relative to the patients’ status:
pre-clinical, clinical pre-diagnostic, and diagnostic (Buckeridge et al. 2002).
An alternative method of categorising the data is to group according the
type of patient behaviour that produces the data: information seeking after
onset of symptoms; care seeking where the patient attempts to contact the
healthcare provider or decides to purchase medication; and post-contact,
when the patient becomes visible in traditional public health surveillance
systems. Data sources most often used for syndromic surveillance, ordered
by availability, from earliest to latest, are as follows (Berger et al. 2006,
Babin et al. 2007):
• over-the-counter drug sales
• triage nurse line calls
• work and school absenteeism
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• prescription drug sales
• emergency hotline calls
• emergency department visit chief complaints
• laboratory test orders
• ambulatory visit records
• veterinary health records
• hospital admissions and discharges
• laboratory test results
• case reports
In a survey of operational syndromic surveillance systems, Buehler et al.
(2008) report that the 52 respondents monitor the following data sources:
emergency department visits (84%), outpatient clinic visits (49%), over-the-
counter medication sales (44%), calls to poison control centres (37%), and
school absenteeism (35%). Another review by Chen et al. (2009) examines 56
systems and presents a comparable distribution of data source usage (p.37).
The availability of data sources depends on the local context of the
project: jurisdiction of the organisation responsible for the system, diag-
noses to be monitored, existing laws regulating data access, and technical
concerns such as ensuring sustained connectivity to the data sources.
Recent research suggests that additional sources such as web search
queries (Hulth et al. 2009, Ginsberg et al. 2009), and Twitter posts (Lampos
et al. 2010) can also contain indicators for disease surveillance.
The timeliness of a data source is often inversely proportional to its
reliability (Buckeridge et al. 2002). Sources with immediate availability
such as Twitter posts or search queries often contain large amounts of false
signals, and usually lack geographic specificity. In contrast, laboratory test
results provide definitive diagnostic information, but they are not available
early. An example between the two extremes is chief complaint records from
emergency departments. These records are available on the same day as the
visit, contain specific signs and symptoms as well as geographic information,
but initially lack diagnoses (Travers et al. 2006).
1.4.2 Analysis
In traditional disease surveillance systems, the data forwarded by the collec-
tion component is associated with a diagnosis directly, and analysis begins.
In syndromic surveillance systems, the data may contain signals for multi-
ple diagnoses. Therefore, every data stream is assigned a syndrome category
before it can be investigated for statistically significant signals. Syndrome
categories are lists of signs and symptoms that indicate specific diseases;
examples include respiratory, gastrointestinal, influenza-like, and rash. The
assignment proceeds in two steps: first, the information relevant to the cat-
egorisation is extracted from the collected data, and second, the extracted
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information is used to associate the data with the syndrome category. The
extraction procedure is trivial for pre-formatted data sources such as over-
the-counter drug sales (the data are already categorised by drug type), but
may require complex methods for free-text data sources such as emergency
department chief complaints. The extracted information is then associated
with one or more syndrome categories, either by using a static mapping of
data sources to diseases, or by an automated decision-making mechanism.
An example of the former is CDC’s syndrome categories in BioSense, and
of the latter, BioStorm’s ontology-driven assignments. Both systems are de-
scribed in more detail in the next section. In existing syndromic surveillance
systems, Bayesian, rule-based, and ontology-based classifiers have been used
to assign syndrome categories (Chen et al. 2009, p.53).
After the categories are assigned, statistical analysis is used to detect
significant signals. These signals may be short-term changes such as sharp
increases or decreases in the number of cases, indicating emerging outbreaks
or effects interventions; or long-term shifts, indicating the appearance of
the disease in previously unaffected age groups or geographical regions.
The literature on statistical analysis of disease surveillance data is vast,
and interested readers are recommended to refer to previously published
reviews (Brookmeyer & Stroup 2003, Sonesson & Bock 2003, Lawson &
Kleinman 2005, Wong & Moore 2006, Burkom 2007) for a more thorough
analysis of existing methods.
Most of the algorithms used in disease surveillance are adapted from
other fields such as industrial process control or econometrics (Buckeridge
et al. 2008), but some have been developed specifically for disease surveil-
lance. Time series methods, mean-regression methods, auto-regressive inte-
grated moving average (ARIMA) models, hidden Markov models (HMMs),
Bayesian HMMs, and scan statistics (Pelecanos et al. 2010) are among the
most commonly used algorithm classes. The spatial and space-time statis-
tics, specifically, have gained popularity among practitioners as methods for
the detection of disease clusters (Kulldorff et al. 2007).
The detection algorithm is chosen based on the needs of the users,
and the available data sources. To aid the decision, the performance of
aberrancy-detection algorithms are often expressed in terms of sensitivity,
specificity, and timeliness (Kleinman & Abrams 2006). Sensitivity (true pos-
itive rate) is the probability that an alarm is raised given that an outbreak
occurs. Specificity (true negative rate) is the probability that no alarm is
raised given that no outbreak occurs. Timeliness is the difference in time be-
tween the event and the raised alarm. Additionally, to be able to understand
and describe the detection algorithms better, researchers have proposed a
classification scheme algorithms that considers the types of information and
the amount of information processed by the algorithms: number of accessi-
ble data sources, number of covariates in each source, and the availability
of spatial information (Buckeridge et al. 2005).
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1.4.3 Notification
The results of the analyses are visualised and communicated to the users
by the notification component. The simplest method of communication is
by providing the statistical output from the analysis method directly to
the user, as a table or in plain text. Although the output contains all the
essential information, understanding these reports is often time-consuming,
and they quickly become overwhelming if many data sources, diagnoses, or
geographic regions are involved in the analysis.
The most common way of summarising the results is by displaying their
values at different time points, using line charts or bar graphs. The variable
may be case reports, ambulance dispatches, drug sales, or any other indicator
used in surveillance. If previously computed historical baselines exist, they
may also be plotted on the same graph, to put the current results in a
larger context. Scatter plots and pie charts may also be used to summarise
non-temporal components of the analysis.
When a spatial analysis method is used, the same variable may be dis-
played using a map where colours, shades, or patterns illustrate the differ-
ences between geographical regions (Cromley & Cromley 2009). Results of
clustering methods, such as spatial scan statistics, may also be visualised
on maps, often using geometric shapes or grids drawn on the map in addi-
tion to the regional borders (Boscoe et al. 2003). Visualising the results of
hybrid spatio-temporal analysis methods may be achieved by animating the
map, or presenting snapshots from the same map at different time points
side-by-side.
Alternatively, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) may be used to
visualise spatial or spatio-temporal analysis results if the data source con-
tains detailed geographical information. These systems are commonly used
in disease surveillance (Nykiforuk & Flaman 2011), and epidemiologists are
more likely to be familiar with GIS software given the long tradition of their
usage (Clarke et al. 1996). In some cases, GIS include their own analy-
sis tools (Chung et al. 2004), but these may be bypassed by importing the
analysis results directly to the visualisation component. A simpler system,
Google Earth (Google 2011), also provides similar functionality for spatial
visualisation.
The result reports and visualisations are communicated to the users pe-
riodically through email, SMS, automated phone calls, web sites, or a dedi-
cated display unit placed at the institution tasked with disease surveillance.
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1.5 Implementations of disease surveillance sys-
tems
Four disease surveillance systems are presented in this section to illustrate
different aspects of existing syndromic surveillance systems. For additional
information on other systems, the reader is recommended to refer to Chen
et al. (2009), which includes an overview of 50 syndromic surveillance sys-
tems and examines eight in further detail. An earlier review of 115 disease
surveillance systems, including nine syndromic surveillance systems, by Bra-
vata et al. (2004) is also informative.
1.5.1 BioSense
BioSense is a CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) initiative
that aims to “support enhanced early detection, quantification, and localisa-
tion of possible biologic terrorism attacks and other events of public health
concern on a national level” (Bradley et al. 2005, p.1). The software com-
ponent of the initiative is called the BioSense application. The development
of the application started in 2003, and the first version was released in 2004.
Initially BioSense included three national data sources: United States
Department of Defence military treatment facilities, United States Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs treatment facilities, and Laboratory Corporation
of America (LabCorp) test orders. In a later technical report, the BioSense
data sources were reported to also include state/regional surveillance sys-
tems, private hospitals and hospital systems, and outpatient pharmacies (CDC
2008). As of May 2008, 454 hospitals from 26 US states were sending data
to BioSense.
The BioSense application classifies incoming data into eleven syndrome
categories: botulism-like, fever, gastrointestinal, hemorrhagic illness, lo-
calised cutaneous lesion, lymphadenitis, neurologic, rash, respiratory, severe
illness and death, and specific infection. The daily statistical analysis is per-
formed using CUSUM (Hutwagner et al. 2003), SMART (Kleinman et al.
2004), and W2 (a modified version of the C2 method (Hutwagner et al. 2003)
for anomaly detection. The data reporting component displays the results
of the analyses as spreadsheets of observed case counts, time series graphs,
patient maps, or detailed case reports.
In 2010 CDC started redesigning the BioSense program. The redesign
aims to expand the scope of BioSense beyond early detection to contribute
information for “public health situational awareness, routine public health
practise, [and] improved health outcomes and public health” (CDC 2011).
Earlier presentations about the future of the project have noted additional
goals about improving the usability of biosurveillance tools and “reducing
excessive features which miss the needs of the users” (Kass-Hout 2009b,
p.19). Open sourcing of the system is also included as a possibility for the
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redesigned BioSense project (Kass-Hout 2009a).
The initial motivation for the development and operation of the BioSense
application was expressed primarily in terms of preventing biologic terror-
ism (Bradley et al. 2005). As part of the redesign, the motivation for devel-
oping the system is broadened considerably:
The goal of the redesign effort is to be able to provide nationwide
and regional situational awareness for all-hazard health-related
threats (beyond bioterrorism) and to support national, state,
and local responses to those threats. (CDC 2011)
The BioSense program has also contributed to the International Society
for Disease Surveillance report on developing syndromic surveillance stan-
dards and guidelines for meaningful use (ISDS 2010). The current BioSense
application is one of the largest syndromic surveillance systems in existence,
and the scope of its next iteration is likely to be influential in defining what
is viable in the field of disease surveillance systems.
1.5.2 RODS
The development of the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance sys-
tem (RODS) began in 1999 at the University of Pittsburgh for the purpose
of detecting the large-scale release of anthrax (Tsui et al. 2003). The sixth
iteration of the software is currently reported to be under development and
the source code for several versions licensed under GNU GPL or Affero GPL
are available from the RODS Open Source Project website (RODS 2009).
The first implementation of RODS in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania collected
chief complaints data from eight hospitals, classified them into syndrome
categories, and analysed the data for anomalies (Espino et al. 2004). The
system was then expanded to collect additional data types and deployed
in multiple states. It was also used as a user-interface to the American
National Retail Data Monitor (Wagner et al. 2003), which collects over-
the-counter medication sales. The most recent publicly available version
of RODS supports user-defined syndrome categories. Implementations of
the recursive least-squared (RLS) algorithm (Hayes 1996) and an initial
implementation of the wavelet-detection algorithm (Zhang et al. 2003) are
also included. The results of the analyses can be displayed as time series
graphs, or work with a GIS to create maps of the spatial distribution.
From a data collection perspective, RODS is the decentralised counter-
part of BioSense. Unlike BioSense, which collects data from a large number
of sources centrally within a single implementation, RODS is designed to be
installed at facilities on the sub-national level to collect and analyse the avail-
able data locally. In 2009, more than 300 healthcare facilities in 15 states in
the U.S., more than 200 in Taiwan, and an unspecified number in Canada
were being monitored by independent RODS implementations (RODS 2009).
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At the time of writing, no updates to the RODS open source project have
been committed to the code repository for the last two years, and the latest
available RODS publications date back to 2008. It is unclear if RODS 6 will
be released in the future, but the availability of the source code for many
earlier versions makes RODS an important resource for developers of disease
surveillance systems.
1.5.3 BioStorm
The BioStorm system (Biological spatio-temporal outbreak reasoning mod-
ule) has been developed at the Stanford Center for Biomedical Informatics
Research in collaboration with McGill University. The goal of the project
is to “develop fundamental knowledge about the performance of aberrancy
detection algorithms used in public health surveillance” (BioSTORM 2009).
The source code for the system is available at BioSTORM (2010).
The aim of the BioStorm project is to create a scalable system that
integrates multiple data sources, includes support for many problem solvers,
and provides flexible configuration options (O’Connor et al. 2003). The
defining feature of the project is the central use of ontologies. A data-source
ontology is used to describe data sources. The descriptions are then used
to map to suitable analysis methods available in the system’s library of
problem solvers (Crube´zy et al. 2005). Intermediate components such as a
data-broker, a mapping interpreter, and a controller are used to connect the
data sources to the analysis methods. The use of ontologies is intended to
ease the process of adding new data sources and new analysis methods to
an existing BioStorm implementation. No existing syndrome categories or
visualisation components are provided, but any category or visualiser can
be added to the system according to the needs of its users.
The BioStorm project differs from the majority of disease surveillance
systems primarily due to its highly complex mechanism for classifying data
sources and problem solvers. The developers reflect on the high overhead
of this approach, but state that the overhead is acceptable for systems that
connect to many data sources and require diverse analysis methods (Buck-
eridge et al. 2003). In contrast, most of the existing syndromic surveillance
systems do not suffer from this overhead, but require additional program-
ming to accommodate new data sources or methods.
The complexity of the BioStorm project creates a significant obstacle for
implementation in a public health facility for day-to-day monitoring. How-
ever, the feature set provided by the project is ideal for systematically com-
paring and evaluating the performance of different analysis methods on dif-
ferent data sources. The possibility of categorising not only the syndromes,
but also the data sources and the analysis methods (Pincus & Musen 2003)
promises to simplify experiment design for evaluating detection algorithms.
The BioStorm source code has not been updated since 2010, and the
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most recent publication related to the project dates back to 2009, but the
source code continues to be available from the Stanford Center for Biomed-
ical Informatics Research (BioSTORM 2010).
1.5.4 HealthMap
HealthMap is a freely accessible web site that integrates data from electronic
sources, and visualises the aggregated information onto the world map, clas-
sified by infectious disease agent, geography, and time. The project aims to
deliver real-time information for emerging infectious diseases. It has been
online since 2006, and its current data sources include Google News, the
ProMED mailing list, World Health Organisation announcements and Eu-
rosurveillance publications, among others (HealthMap 2011a). HealthMap
uses automated text processing to classify incoming alerts and to create or
update points of interest on the world map based on the classification re-
sults (Freifeld et al. 2008). The time-frame of alerts, the number of alerts,
and the number of sources providing information are reflected by the colour
of the markers for the points of interest on the world map. HealthMap also
includes an interface for users to report missing outbreaks.
HealthMap’s reliability, much like any other system, depends on the
reliability of its data sources. Since it accesses less reliable sources compared
to the systems discussed previously, different weights are assigned to different
sources based on their credibility when creating reports to offset the influence
of less reliable reports (Brownstein et al. 2008).
HealthMap is unique among the systems discussed so far because its
analysis results are available to all world wide web users instead of a small
group of experts. The results can be made available without major pri-
vacy concerns because all of the incoming data are also publicly available
on the web. Another notable system that employs a similar approach is
EpiSpider (Tolentino et al. 2007).
A recent HealthMap feature, Outbreaks Near Me (HealthMap 2011b),
provides the users with mobile tools to report and view outbreaks. Access-
ing the system without a standard browser requires a smart-phone which
limits its availability, but it is argued that such limitations will eventually
be overcome with cheaper devices (Freifeld et al. 2010). The development
of HealthMap-like systems signifies the presence of a different perspective in
public health surveillance, where a larger group of users are able to influence
the surveillance process and access the results of statistical analyses.
1.6 Discussion
When building tools to improve the health of populations, technical advances
in the development of disease surveillance systems ensuring timely detection,
less false positives, etc., are clearly important. However, the field of public
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health defines its object of interest as a population, and issues that directly
affect the lives of individuals comprising the population must be considered
in a broader perspective when developing surveillance systems.
Disease surveillance is used to monitor the population for signs of dis-
ease, and, in case of detection, to propose strategies to cure or control it.
It functions at a different level, away from the population itself, watching
for signs of the disease hosted in the population. Fearnley (2010) provides a
detailed account of this conceptual decoupling of the disease and the host, in
the contemporary understanding of disease surveillance, through the career
of the influential epidemiologist Alexander Langmuir. In his examination,
Fearnley locates the transformation of the epidemic “from a problem of
population pathology into a discrete event framed by outbreak and subsi-
dence” (p.42). The decoupling, now widely accepted as a valid methodology
for disease surveillance, is carried one step further with the introduction of
syndromic surveillance. In syndromic surveillance, data streams tracking
the activities of the population are monitored for unusual signs associated
with categories that correspond to diagnoses, which may in turn indicate the
presence of actual diseases. Predictably, two levels removed from the source,
any indicator becomes weaker. Practitioners have voiced the concern that
syndromic surveillance signals are insignificant in the absence of follow-up
investigations (Heffernan et al. 2004b, p.863).
The ideological shift, following the methodological one, that syndromic
surveillance has offered to the practise of disease surveillance is identified
by Fearnley (2008) in the conflict between two styles of governing: “public
health (a responsibility for maximal population health) and preparedness (a
concern for disaster-scale events)” (p.1615). Public health as a governing
style aims to increase the health of the governed population while acknowl-
edging that the scope of its acts are limited by both costs and available
knowledge, or the perceived lack of it. This style “uses legal authority to
expand its access to population health data” (p.1617). In contrast, the roots
of the style of preparedness lie in the Cold War era, where the distinctions
between battlefield and homefront were blurred, and an awareness of the
permanent state of readiness where threats can attack anywhere without
warning was encouraged. The techniques of the preparedness style involve
declaring structures or institutions vulnerable by imagining the effects of a
threat materialising or being carried out successfully in the future. Due to its
positioning against uncertainty, or towards the prevention of the uncertain
“[t]he evaluation of syndromic surveillance for bioterrorism preparedness
could not make reference to a statistical logic of costs and benefits”(p.1627).
It is impossible to judge the costs or who would suffer them, or conversely,
the benefits and who would enjoy them, without specifying the properties
of the unknown to be prepared for.
In an attempt to frame the unknown, the motivation for developing
syndromic surveillance systems often includes the rapid detection and pre-
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vention of acts of bio-terrorism. However, no bio-terrorism attacks anywhere
in the world were detected in the first half of the last decade (Cooper et al.
2006), and none have been reported in the second half. Researchers had
identified the threat of bio-terrorism as an exaggeration (Sidel et al. 2002)
soon after the development of national syndromic surveillance systems in the
United States. Two years later, they asked the public health community to
“acknowledge the substantial harm that bioterrorism preparedness has al-
ready caused and develop mechanisms to increase our public health resources
and to allocate them to address the world’s real health needs.” (Cohen et al.
2004, p.1670). A later assessment of the bio-terrorism threat also reached
similar conclusions (Leitenberg 2005).
When the diversity of communicable diseases hosted by the world pop-
ulation and the suffering caused by the diseases are considered against the
threat of bio-terrorism, the rift between the two governing styles, public
health and preparedness, is clearly visible. Proposals for developing new
disease surveillance systems must either engage the preparedness question
and clearly identify the goals of surveillance, or risk searching endlessly for
the significant in a sea of noise.
1.7 Advances on state-of-the-art
The structural analysis of syndromic surveillance systems presented earlier
provides tools to plan for the development of new systems, or to aid the
understanding of existing systems. The first paper in chapter 2 describes
a design process that has been guided by these principles. The design was
inspired by syndromic surveillance, but its solutions are aimed towards a
later stage in disease surveillance, after the diagnoses are reported. The
freely available, open source software package aims to ease the burden of
connecting a data source of reported cases to multiple statistical analysis
methods, and to provide a communication channel for regular updates of
the results to epidemiologists.
The second paper presents the lessons learned from a software develop-
ment project of more than 100 person months in the form of a check list.
The open source software package, a spatially explicit model for the entire
Swedish population built on registry data, has been used to simulate out-
breaks of smallpox and influenza-like illnesses. Computational models are
used in disease surveillance systems to create simulated data for testing de-
tection algorithms, but using the simulation results for decision support, the
main goal of the project, introduces new methodological challenges. The dis-
cussion of these challenges contributes to the methodological advancement
of computational epidemiology.
Complex disease surveillance systems are still in their infancy. This
thesis explores their foundations, analyses the structure of existing examples,
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and offers guidelines for future research in the field.
1.8 Author’s contributions
The next chapter contains two papers with Cakici as the main author. In
total, Cakici has contributed approximately 27 person months to the devel-
opment of the described software packages.
The first paper, Cakici et al. (2010), was initiated by Cakici, Saretok, and
Hulth as the project leader. Saretok had already built a prototype before
Cakici joined the project. Cakici and Saretok re-designed and re-developed
the application using a database for storage instead of local files to ensure
scalability. The first draft of the manuscript was prepared by Cakici, Hulth
and Saretok. Cakici and Hulth were responsible for editing the manuscript,
and it was submitted by Cakici.
The second paper, A workflow for software development within computa-
tional epidemiology (under review, Journal of Computational Science), was
produced in close collaboration with Boman. The writing and editing of the
text was shared equally, and the simulations were set up and analysed by
Cakici.
The research resulting in this licentiate thesis began in 2009 at the
Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control (SMI), and SICS, the
Swedish Institute of Computer Science. From January 2011, it continued at
the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), the unit for Software and Com-
puter Systems (SCS) at the School of ICT.
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1.9 A list of disease surveillance systems
A list of disease surveillance systems and publications describing them are
included below for interested readers.
System acronym Name or description Reference
B-SAFER Bio-surveillance analysis, feedback, evaluation
and response
(Brillman et al. 2003)
BioPortal An information sharing and data analysis en-
vironment
(Zeng et al. 2005)
BioSense A national early event detection and situa-
tional awareness system
(Bradley et al. 2005)
BioSTORM Biological spatio-temporal outbreak reasoning
module
(Crube´zy et al. 2005)
btsurveillance The national bioterrorism syndromic surveil-
lance demonstration program
(Yih et al. 2004)
DiSTRIBuTE Influenza surveillance system (Diamond et al. 2009)
EARS Early aberration reporting system (Hutwagner et al. 2003)
ESSENCE II The electronic surveillance system for the early
notification of community-based epidemics
(Lombardo et al. 2003)
HealthMap Global health, local information (Brownstein et al. 2008)
INFERNO Integrated forecasts and early enteric outbreak
detection system
(Naumova et al. 2005)
RODS Real-time outbreak detection system (Tsui et al. 2003)
RSVP Rapid syndrome validation project (Zelicoff et al. 2001)
AEGIS Automated epidemiologic geotemporal inte-
grated surveillance system
(Reis et al. 2007)
CASE Computer assisted search for epidemics (Cakici et al. 2010)
EWRS Early warning and response system (Guglielmetti et al. 2006)
NEDSS The national electronic disease surveillance
system
(M’ikantha et al. 2003)
NNDSS Australian notifiable disease surveillance sys-
tem
(NNDSS 2010)
SmiNet An internet-based surveillance system for com-
municable diseases in Sweden
(Rolfhamre et al. 2006)
TESSy The European surveillance system (ECDC 2010)
Chen et al. (2009) describe the first 12 systems listed above in further
detail. As noted previously, Bravata et al. (2004) provide an extensive review
of 115 disease surveillance systems.
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outbreak detection
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Abstract
Background: In computer supported outbreak detection, a statistical method is applied to a collection of cases to detect 
any excess cases for a particular disease. Whether a detected aberration is a true outbreak is decided by a human 
expert. We present a technical framework designed and implemented at the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease 
Control for computer supported outbreak detection, where a database of case reports for a large number of infectious 
diseases can be processed using one or more statistical methods selected by the user.
Results: Based on case information, such as diagnosis and date, different statistical algorithms for detecting outbreaks 
can be applied, both on the disease level and the subtype level. The parameter settings for the algorithms can be 
configured independently for different diagnoses using the provided graphical interface. Input generators and output 
parsers are also provided for all supported algorithms. If an outbreak signal is detected, an email notification is sent to 
the persons listed as receivers for that particular disease.
Conclusions: The framework is available as open source software, licensed under GNU General Public License Version 
3. By making the code open source, we wish to encourage others to contribute to the future development of 
computer supported outbreak detection systems, and in particular to the development of the CASE framework.
Background
In this paper, we describe the design and implementation
of a computer supported outbreak detection system called
CASE (named after the protagonist of the William Gib-
son novel Neuromancer), or Computer Assisted Search
for Epidemics. The system is currently in use at the Swed-
ish Institute for Infectious Disease Control (SMI) and
performs daily surveillance using data obtained from
SmiNet [1], the national notifiable disease database in
Sweden.
Computer supported outbreak detection is performed
in two steps:
1 A statistical method is automatically applied to a
collection of case reports in order to detect an
unusual or unexpected number of cases for a particu-
lar disease.
2 An investigation by a human expert (an epidemiolo-
gist) is performed to determine whether the detected
irregularity denotes an actual outbreak.
The main function of a computer supported outbreak
detection system is to warn for potential outbreaks. In
some cases, the system might be able to detect outbreaks
earlier than human experts. Additionally, it might detect
certain outbreaks that human experts would have over-
looked. However, the system does not aim to replace
human experts (hence the prefix "computer supported");
it should rather be considered a complement to daily sur-
veillance activities. To a smaller extent, the system can
also aid less experienced epidemiologists in identifying
outbreaks.
Systems for outbreak detection which support multiple
algorithms include RODS [2], BioSTORM [3] and AEGIS
[4]. Additionally, computer supported outbreak detection
systems operating on the national level have been used
previously in a number of countries, including Germany
[5] and the Netherlands [6].
Health care in Sweden
The health care system in Sweden is governed by 21
county councils. Each county has appointed a medical
officer, who is in charge of the regional infectious disease
prevention and control. Every confirmed or suspected
* Correspondence: baki.cakici@smi.se
1 Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control (SMI), 171 82 Solna, Sweden
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case of a notifiable disease is reported both to the county
medical officer and to SMI. At SMI, the regular national
surveillance is currently performed by thirteen epidemi-
ologists, each in charge of a number of different diseases.
All 21 county medical officers as well as the majority of
the hospitals and the laboratories in Sweden are con-
nected to the SmiNet database. The database collects
clinical reports and information on laboratory verified
samples. In 2008, a total of 174 811 reports were submit-
ted to SmiNet. 87 per cent of these reports were submit-
ted electronically and those that were not submitted
electronically were entered into SmiNet manually. Of the
92 744 lab reports, as much as 97 per cent were submitted
electronically and 62 per cent fully automatically. The
reports were subsequently merged into 74 367 case
reports. These reports form the basis of the data used by
CASE to perform outbreak detection.
Implementation
CASE is designed to be administered using a graphical
interface, and can operate on all of the 63 notifiable dis-
eases in Sweden. One or more statistical detection meth-
ods can be applied to each disease. If more than one
method is activated, result reports are generated inde-
pendently. By default, the data are aggregated over all dis-
ease subtypes, but the system allows detection of single
subtypes as well. When an outbreak signal is generated,
an alert is sent by email to all members of the notification
list for that particular disease.
CASE is composed of three interconnected compo-
nents for configuration, extraction and detection. The
configuration component provides a graphical user inter-
face for modifying detection parameters and editing the
list of recipients for generated alerts. The extraction com-
ponent is used to copy data from the national case data-
base to the local database. The detection component is
scheduled to run at regular intervals and automatically
applies the chosen statistical methods to the currently
selected diseases.
System Description
CASE is developed using Java to ensure platform-inde-
pendence of all components. Currently at SMI all three
components run on Ubuntu, a Linux-based operating
system. The local database for CASE is MySQL and the
national database, SmiNet, is Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
Figure 1 shows the flow of information within the
framework. The extraction and detection components
are scheduled to run once every 24 hours at midnight
using the standard Unix scheduling service cron. When
the extraction component is executed, it transfers data
from SmiNet to the local database. The local database
stores the case data and the configuration parameters for
all algorithms. The configuration module can be used to
view and modify the parameters. The detection compo-
nent is executed automatically after all required data have
been extracted from SmiNet. It applies the detection
methods with the given parameters to the case data for
the selected diseases, and emails notifications if any alerts
are generated. Detailed logs of these processes are gener-
ated automatically.
Configuration
The configuration component is a graphical user inter-
face that allows the administrator to mark diseases for
detection, choose the detection methods to be applied to
each diagnosis/subtype and manage the list of epidemiol-
ogists that will receive alerts in case a warning is gener-
ated. The settings are stored in a local database that is
also accessed by the other two components. The system
can be administered by multiple users who access the
same local database.
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the graphical user inter-
face for the CASE administrator. The notifiable diseases
are displayed in the left column. These entries can be
expanded using the arrow to display their subtypes.
Parameters for the current selection are shown on the
right hand side. The Algorithms tab lists the available
methods. Parameters for the selected method can be
modified by double-clicking the name of the method. The
E-mail tab contains a list of recipients for the selected
disease and/or subtype. If an alert is generated after
detection, the algorithm that generated the alert is high-
Figure 1 CASE Flowchart. A flowchart demonstrating the detection 
process in CASE.
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lighted in red. The flag is automatically cleared every
night before a new detection batch is executed.
Extraction
CASE uses data retrieved from SmiNet to perform out-
break detection. A case report is created in SmiNet when
a clinical or a laboratory report is received, provided that
this patient does not already exist in the database. When
additional reports arrive, the original case report is auto-
matically updated with the new information. Depending
on the number of days that have elapsed since the last
time a patient received a particular diagnosis, a new case
report might be created for the same diagnosis and
patient. For a detailed technical description of SmiNet,
see [1].
The extraction component populates the local database
with data from the case reports stored in SmiNet. Diag-
nosis, lab species, date, and reporting county are copied
for every case, except those with infections that are
reported to have originated abroad. No information that
can reveal a patient's identity is used in the outbreak
detection process. There are approximately twenty dates
in SmiNet for each case report, ranging from dates that
are automatically generated by the system to dates
entered by the clinician or the laboratory. There is, how-
ever, only one date that is available on all case reports,
namely statistics date. This automatically set date corre-
sponds to when a patient first appears in SmiNet with a
particular diagnosis. The date that would best reflect
when a patient fell ill is the date when the sample was
taken from the patient. However, many case reports do
not contain this date. For example, for 2008 this date is
missing in 29 per cent of the case reports. When the case
information is copied from SmiNet to the local database,
the extraction component fetches the statistics date as the
date for the case.
Detection
CASE is developed by the Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease Control, and has a national perspective on out-
breaks. Its primary role is to find outbreaks that cover
more than one county, especially those with few cases in
each affected county, as these might be difficult to detect
for the local authorities.
The detection component uses the selected statistical
method(s) on all activated diseases and sends notification
emails if any alerts are raised. If there are too few data
points for a detection algorithm to produce a result --
Figure 2 Administrator GUI. A screenshot of the graphical user interface for the CASE administrator.
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which is often the case for detection on the subtype level
-- this information is written to the log file. The system
currently supports four different statistical methods for
detection: SaTScan Poisson [7], SaTScan Space-Time Per-
mutation [8], an algorithm developed by Farrington et al.
[9], and a simple threshold algorithm. The methods are
briefly described below. Three of the four methods are
freely available implementations, while the fourth was
developed within the project and is included in CASE's
source code. For the external programs, input generators
and output parsers are also contained within the source
code. It is possible to extend the system with additional
statistical methods, although this requires a certain famil-
iarity with the Java programming language. We are cur-
rently in the process of adding the OutbreakP method
[10] to the core package.
SaTScan is a freely available spatial, temporal and
space-time data analysis platform [11]. Two algorithms
from this application are used in CASE: SaTScan Poisson
which uses the discrete Poisson SaTScan model to search
for spatial clusters and SaTScan Space-Time Permutation,
which searches for spatio-temporal clusters. Both models
are applied to data at the county-level resolution. The
population data required by SaTScan Poisson are
obtained from Statistics Sweden [12]. The SaTScan Pois-
son parser, developed specifically for CASE, raises an
alert if a detected cluster ends within the last week.
The third detection method was developed by, and is in
regular use at the Health Protection Agency in England
and Wales [9]. In CASE, we use the surveillance R-pack-
age implementation [13] of the method and we refer to it
as the Farrington algorithm. The algorithm is used on
data aggregated at the national level, to investigate if the
current disease incidence exceeds that of the reference
data from previous years. The CASE parser for the Far-
rington output ensures that an alert is sent only if an
exceedance occurred during the last two weeks. The
required window size is implemented as a sliding window
of seven days and detection is performed daily.
The threshold algorithm is used to generate alerts when
the number of cases for a particular disease rises above a
manually defined value, with the number of cases aggre-
gated at the national level.
For all methods, as long as an outbreak is ongoing
according to the results of the statistical analysis, a new
alert is raised every night. Figure 3 shows an alert email
that is sent to the recipients of "MRSA infection". The
graph is automatically generated by the detection compo-
nent and shows all computed alarms on the x-axis. The
computed threshold is denoted by the blue curve (the
graph in Figure 3 was generated using simulated data).
The email also includes a brief description of the algo-
rithm that generated the alarm.
Results and Discussion
CASE is a technical framework designed to ease the pro-
cess of connecting a data source with reported cases to
various statistical methods requiring different input for-
mats. When using CASE, the user can select the methods
that are best suited to the characteristics of a particular
disease.
CASE can also be used as a platform for comparing dif-
ferent detection algorithms, although that is not its pri-
mary purpose. Since all algorithms use the same data,
running multiple detection methods on the same disease
regularly and comparing the successful detections and
the false warnings can provide insights into the accuracy
of a certain method for a given disease. Comparisons and
evaluations of the statistical methods currently included
in CASE can be found in, for example, [14] and [15].
Here, the importance of calibrating the parameters for
the detection methods must be emphasized, something
which is still an ongoing work at SMI.
At present, the evaluation of the system is mainly quali-
tative, consisting of frequent discussions between the epi-
demiologists and the CASE developers. There is,
however, a need for more systematic evaluations of the
system, including a questionnaire assessing the users'
experience, in addition to quantitative evaluations of the
performance of the algorithms and the parameter set-
tings. To facilitate the quantitative evaluations, we plan to
extend the functionality of CASE to incorporate an evalu-
ation module allowing the algorithms to be run retro-
spectively, with analysis carried out for each day in a
specified time period. The main objective is not a general
comparison of the algorithms, but an assessment of their
performance in the specific context of the data they are
used on. Where external data telling when actual out-
breaks have occurred are available, measures such as sen-
sitivity and specificity can be calculated. The evaluation
module would provide valuable guidance in the choice of
algorithms and parameter settings for the end user.
Another evaluation feature we consider implementing is
the possibility to run simulated data in the system.
CASE currently uses emails for notification. The
advantage of this approach is that it presents information
to the users in a familiar way and does not require them
to learn how to operate a new interface. The disadvan-
tage, on the other hand, is that the system becomes one-
sided if the emails do not include a feedback mechanism.
Regardless of the actual implementation, a system for
providing feedback from the receivers of the signals is
essential. Currently, users who would like to provide feed-
back on CASE output are instructed to email the admin-
istrator.
As expected, a relatively simple method operating on
accurate and informative data produces better results
than a complex method operating on noisy data. There-
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fore, the most important factor for creating a reliable out-
break detection system is to ensure the quality of the
input data. If the input is not reliable, improving the data
collection process from local medical centres is a much
better investment than trying to perform automatic
detection on inaccurate data. Additionally, expectations
from an automated detection system must be realistic.
For a computer, detecting ongoing outbreaks and sea-
Figure 3 Alert Email. A sample email for a disease alert.
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sonal regular outbreaks is possible, but predicting an out-
break at onset is currently not feasible.
CASE is designed primarily to analyze case reports and
does not provide syndromic surveillance support using
external data sources, unlike RODS [2] or BioSTORM [3].
The only requirement for the operation of CASE is access
to a case database for notifiable diseases. All scripts to
create and configure the intermediate local database are
included in the software package. The local database is
used to selectively copy and store case reports after
removing all information that can reveal a patient's iden-
tity. We believe that the ease of configuration and mainte-
nance in addition to the possibility of operating without
storing highly sensitive data make CASE a strong candi-
date for use in national infectious disease surveillance.
Conclusions
In this paper we have described the design and imple-
mentation of a publicly available technical framework for
computer supported outbreak detection. The source code
is licensed under GNU GPLv3 [16] and is available from
https://smisvn.smi.se/case.
The CASE framework is designed to be a complete sys-
tem for computer supported outbreak detection at the
national level. We are aware that any outbreak detection
system must always be adapted to a particular context,
where national requirements and regulations will affect
the implementation of the system. Such adaptations can
easily be made within the described framework. By mak-
ing the code open source, we wish to encourage others to
contribute to the future development of computer sup-
ported outbreak detection systems, and in particular to
the development of the CASE framework.
Availability and requirements
The source code for CASE is licensed under GNU Gen-
eral Public License Version 3 (GPLv3), and is available for
download from https://smisvn.smi.se/case. The provided
documentation and the interface are written in English.
The following software must be installed on the target
system in order to use CASE:
• Linux or Windows operating system that can run
Sun Java Runtime Environment 6.0 (or higher)
• MySQL 5.1 (or higher)
• SaTScan version 8.0.1 (or higher)
• R version 2.9.1 (or higher)
• ImageMagick 6.5.4 (or higher)
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Abstract
A critical investigation into computational models developed for studying the spread of
communicable disease is presented. The case in point is a spatially explicit micro-meso-
macro model for the entire Swedish population built on registry data, thus far used for
smallpox and for influenza-like illnesses. The lessons learned from a software development
project of more than 100 person months are collected into a check list. The list is intended
for use by computational epidemiologists and policy makers, and the workflow incorporating
these two roles is described in detail.
Keywords: Policy making, computational epidemiology, workflow, individual-based
simulation.
1. Introduction
1.1. Computational Epidemiology
In 1916, Ross noted that mathematical
studies of epidemics were few in number in
spite of the fact that “vast masses of statis-
tics have long been awaiting proper exam-
ination” (page 205, [1]). In the 90 years
which followed, the studies made were an-
alytic, and the micro-level data available
were largely left waiting, to leave room for
systems of differential equations built on
homogeneous mixing. This is remarkable
not least because the modeling problem re-
mains the same throughout history: “One
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: cakici@kth.se (Baki
Cakici), mab@kth.se (Magnus Boman)
(or more) infected person is introduced into
a community of individuals, more or less
susceptible to the disease in question. The
disease spreads from the affected to the un-
affected by contact infection. Each infected
person runs through the course of his sick-
ness, and finally is removed from the num-
ber of those who are sick, by recovery or
by death. The chances of recovery or death
vary from day to day during the course of
his illness. The chances that the affected
may convey infection to the unaffected are
likewise dependent upon the stage of the
sickness.” (page 700, [2]). Heterogeneity
is present already in this classic descrip-
tion, in several places; susceptibility, mor-
bidity, and also contact patterns, if only
implicitly. Only with the advent of pow-
erful personal computers, were micro-level
data given a role in the modeling of epi-
demics. Executable simulation models in
which each individual could be modeled as
an active object with its own attributes [3],
often referred to as an agent, began to ap-
pear [4, 5, 6]. A new area within computer
science, computational epidemiology, has
recently become established as the scientific
study of all things epidemiological except
the medical aspects. This area is turning
into computational science (see, e.g., [7]),
following the example of computational bi-
ology, computational neurology, computa-
tional medicine, and several other new areas
focusing on building computationally effi-
cient executable models. This development
also includes the social sciences, as in com-
putational sociology [8].
1.2. Model Description
The model on which the analysis below
is based has been continuously developed
since 2002 by a cross-disciplinary group
of researchers from the fields of medicine,
statistics, mathematics, sociology and com-
puter science. Since 2004, a team of de-
velopers have implemented various versions
of a software tool, representing the compu-
tational part of the model, recently made
available as open source software and li-
censed under GNU General Public License
Version 3 [9]. In parallel with the implemen-
tation, the requirements on the model have
changed many times. It began as a model
for predicting the effects of a possible small-
pox outbreak in Sweden [10], which was
later transformed into a model for study-
ing pandemic influenza, and is now a model
that could be used for many different kinds
of communicable disease studies (excluding
vector-borne diseases, i.e., diseases with ani-
mal reservoirs). The model is a detailed rep-
resentation of real situations, sometimes re-
ferred to as a tactical model, as opposed to
simpler strategic models [11]. For instance,
the model was recently used to study a fic-
titious scenario of H4N6: a new influenza
virus strain that was assumed to be deadly,
highly contagious, and introduced into a
completely susceptible population. In all,
the development project has included more
than 100 person months of implementation
work, and consists of more than 5000 lines
of C++ code.
The parameters used to represent individ-
uals in the model are age, sex and current
status (alive or deceased). Each individual
is also assigned a home, a workplace, and
a department within that workplace. The
movement of individuals outside of home
and workplace are represented using travel
status (home or in another location), emer-
gency room visits, and hospitalizations.
Infections caused by social contact out-
side of work or home are classified as con-
text infections. When the context infec-
tion process is active, there is a probabil-
ity that an infectious individual will infect
those that live within a fixed radius. Con-
text contact radius defines the size of neigh-
borhoods, mirroring the interaction of every
individual with others, based on geographi-
cal proximity and the social network.
The disease affects every individual
through three parameters: infectiousness,
death risk, and place preference. The in-
fectiousness parameter influences the prob-
ability that the infected individual will in-
fect others in the same home, workplace, or
neighborhood. The death risk depends on
the disease level and is expressed as a prob-
ability. Place preference is the probability
distribution used when deciding where the
individuals will spend their day (workplace,
home, primary care, or hospital). These pa-
rameters are defined for five levels of sever-
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ity: asymptomatic, mild, intermediate, se-
vere, and critical. In addition, there are four
disease profiles: asymptomatic, mild, typi-
cal, and atypical.
The model description is combined with
Swedish data on workplaces, households,
and individuals. Workplaces include com-
panies, schools, healthcare, and other state
institutions. For each workplace, the data
indicate the total number of workers, geo-
graphical coordinates, and workplace type.
The current version of the simulation plat-
form uses data from the Swedish Total Pop-
ulation Register, the Swedish Employment
register, and the Geographic Database of
Sweden (cf. [12]).
Because the model was developed with
the purpose of being run with data for
the country of Sweden, it has been used
solely for studying outbreaks in that coun-
try. Sweden has relatively many infection
clinics and good international reputation
for detailed clinical reports of communica-
ble disease. Thus, in some areas of dis-
ease control, Sweden works well as a role
model. Other countries face special local
problems, however, and results have sought
to be generalizable, for example contribut-
ing to the complicated model of EU care-
seeking behavior. Generally speaking, the
project goals have included to sensitize pol-
icy makers to the scope of possible disrup-
tion due to a newly emergent disease event,
and to identify a range of policy handles
which can be used to respond to such an
episode.
A sample case description illustrates how
an experiment would be described using the
executable model. The sample case sim-
ulates the effects of pandemic influenza in
Sweden, without any interventions, for 300
days. The simulation is initiated with 50 in-
fected individuals, randomly selected from
the entire population. Since the data set is
registry data for the entire country, any ran-
dom selection procedure is uniform, i.e., an
individual has a 50 in nine million chance
of being initially infected. This does not
mirror realistic spread, which would more
typically be an airplane or a boat arriving
to Sweden with one or more infected indi-
viduals on board, but in the sample case it
at least provides an opportunity to discuss
the complex matter of how epidemics start.
The maximum size for an office is set to 16
individuals and all workplaces with more
than 16 employees are split into depart-
ments, each containing 16 or fewer mem-
bers. This value is not arbitrary, but cor-
responds to the average size of a Swedish
workplace. Context contacts—the parame-
ter representing the average number of con-
tacts outside the home or the workplace—is
set to 15. Even if that number was recom-
mended by the sociologists in the project, it
is somewhat arbitrary, and is therefore sub-
jected to sensitivity analyses in our sample
case. Naturally, such analyses would be ex-
tensive in a real policy case; here the reason
for their inclusion is chiefly pedagogical.
1.3. Disposition
A report on lessons learned from the soft-
ware development project constitutes the
bulk of the analysis below. It starts with
a description of the workflow in a compu-
tational epidemiology project, and observa-
tions on the micro-meso-macro link follow.
More detailed descriptions of what it actu-
ally means to manage and run a simulator
are then provided, before discussing the sci-
entific merits and challenges of this kind of
research, and the concluding check list is
presented.
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2. Workflow
2.1. Model Development
The process of developing a model for
outbreaks today often includes the devel-
opment of a simulator, allowing for sce-
nario execution and relatively swift sensi-
tivity analyses. The simulator does not cap-
ture the entire model, but only those parts
that are subject to uncertainty or those that
involve stochastic parameters. The instiga-
tor is typically a policy maker (PM), knowl-
edgeable in public health issues, and seek-
ing to evaluate various scenarios. The PM
may well have medical training, or even be
an epidemiologist. The implementer of the
simulator is a computational epidemiologist
(CE): a modeler knowledgeable in computer
science, and the social sciences, typically
without much medical training. Naturally,
both PM and CE could denote a team in-
stead of a single person. A schematic work-
flow for developing and using a simulator,
depicting the roles of both PM and CE, is
presented in Figure 1.
As in all development projects, work be-
gins with a requirements specification, to
which the PM contributes user requirements
and the CE contributes technical exper-
tise. From this specification, the simula-
tor is built. It consists of a software pack-
age with two parts: a simulation engine
and a world description. The latter is not
the complete description of the world under
study, but covers only those parts that have
a bearing on the executable model. This
modeling work is carried out by the CE,
with considerable assistance from medical
professionals. The CE implements the sim-
ulator in accordance with the specification
and medical expertise. The CE will also
seek to verify the accuracy of the simulator
(e.g., through extensive testing, or even log-
ical proof). The CE works in two distinct
sequential steps that cannot be combined:
design and implementation. Software engi-
neers are taught not to modify their design
during the implementation stage to “im-
prove” the model, no matter how tempt-
ing this might be. If design decisions leak
into the implementation stage, the software
project quickly becomes impossible to main-
tain. What software design means in the
area of computational epidemiology is the
craft of knowing which parameters to vary,
being aware of their mutual dependence,
and how to openly declare all simplifying
assumptions.
Once the simulator is complete it is given
a version number, and one may proceed
to experiments. For an experiment to be
meaningful, the PM must envisage scenar-
ios. The PM must also provide values for
some input parameters. Each parameter
in the model is important, and even slight
changes to an input value might have a dras-
tic effect on the output. The kind of model
considered here is a complex system: a sys-
tem which cannot be understood through
understanding its parts. Before the CE can
run the system, the world description must
be populated with data, which typically
need a significant amount of post-processing
to allow for smooth use in the simulator.
In addition, one must then attempt to as-
certain that the resulting data set is accu-
rate and noise-free. The data set in the
here described model was sensitive with re-
spected to personal integrity, as it consisted
of registry data on the entire Swedish popu-
lation of approximately nine million individ-
uals. This sensitivity rendered many kinds
of replication experiments impossible.
Once the system runs, it will produce a
vast amount of output, so experiments must
be set up carefully to avoid information
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overload. The so-called induction trap—the
lure of running too many experiments for
each scenario because it is easy to produce
more output, and then jumping to induc-
tive conclusions too swiftly [13]—must also
be avoided. The output and logs of a set
of runs typically do not lend themselves to
straightforward reading, but require post-
processing. In practice, this means turn-
ing huge text files into calculable spread-
sheets, and further into graphs and dia-
grams. Those outputs can then be pre-
sented back to the PM, who can then call
for more experiments, sensitivity analyses,
or even a revision of the requirements spec-
ification. The CE in this process makes
certain design choices, e.g., which output
data to present and how. It is important
that this process is iterative and that the
PM is given the option of making informed
choices, by having at least some grasp of
what is realistic to do, given the constraints
of computational complexity. The CE must
provide technical specifications on further
experiments, and the technical competence
used also comes with a responsibility to
inform: the PM must know what options
there are, and why and how certain results
were omitted or deemed irrelevant. Because
the PM is typically the one responsible for
acting upon results obtained, a chain of
trust to the CE must be upheld. Likewise,
the CE should react if the PM, for example,
calls only for certain experiments to be run,
or if the selection is made so as to confirm
a preconceived truth, in a pseudo-scientific
fashion [14].
In principle, the output of the executable
model can finally be validated by compar-
ing its predictions to real outcomes of ac-
tual policy interventions for the population
modeled, given that the input parameters
adequately model the real population prior
to those interventions. Naturally, some sce-
narios could be considered extreme (e.g.,
the introduction of an entirely new influenza
virus to a population without native immu-
nity) and are simulated precisely because
they cannot be studied in the real world. In
such scenarios, validation can, at best, per-
tain only to parts of the model. More im-
portantly, simulations of outbreaks are diffi-
cult to validate because the simulated event
is rare. Catastrophic events are character-
ized by low probability and disastrous con-
sequences (see, e.g., [15]), and yet the input
data are collected from the normal state of
the population in non-outbreak situations.
Using this input, the simulator is expected
to produce one possible yet highly unlikely
scenario to provide researchers and policy
makers with more opportunities to observe
and learn about the unlikely event.
Since computational epidemiology is
problem-oriented and constitutes applied
science, models are often pragmatic in the
sense that they are adapted to their use as
policy-supporting tools. Any provisos made
have to be grounded in the culture of the
decision making entity, such as a govern-
ment or a pharmaceutical company, mak-
ing alignment studies, in which models are
docked for replication studies [16] difficult.
2.2. The Micro-Meso-Macro Link
In microsimulation models of outbreaks,
individuals are exposed to the disease and
may infect other individuals that they come
into contact with. The most primitive unit
is the individual and the focus is on the
activities of the individual, for the pur-
poses of studying transmission. By con-
trast, macrosimulation focuses not on the
individual, but on the whole society. All
members (i.e., the whole, possibly stratified,
population) share the same properties and
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move between different disease states such
as susceptible, infected, and resistant.
Even if originally conceived as a pure mi-
crosimulation model, the executable model
discussed here has macro-level parameters,
e.g., workplace size. This parameter gov-
erns how many colleagues a working indi-
vidual interacts with during a working day.
To “interact with” here means that there
is an opportunity for infection, given that
either the individual or the colleague is ill.
Even though micro data are available for
each workplace—including the number of
employees at each company—it is defensi-
ble not to use these data in full, since large
workplaces have so many employees that it
makes no sense to assume that the individ-
ual interacts with them all. In reality, the
individual might not even see more than a
fraction of the total number of colleagues on
a given day. The workplace size is therefore
set to a precise value, meant to capture an
average number of colleagues, which is kept
constant throughout a set of runs.
By definition, macro models do not repre-
sent local interaction. However, in any dy-
namic model utilizing micro data, including
SIR-inspired individual-based models [17],
local interaction will affect the output. If
there appear discernible patterns in the out-
put that are not explicitly stated by the
model description at the outset, they are
referred to as emergent patterns. In the de-
scribed model, all output logs are mapped
onto a real population. This means that ev-
ery discernible pattern has an interpretation
that can be understood in the epidemiolog-
ical context, using terms such as “spread”
and “giant component”, and also in the so-
cietal context, using terms like “number of
infected” and “absenteeism”. Hence, pat-
terns discernible at the macro level result-
ing from local interactions at the micro level
are easily made understandable to the PM.
The meso layer [18] includes everything
that is more general than the properties
of single individuals but less general than
the properties of the whole society. In the
model at hand, this is most visible in neigh-
borhoods, defined by the geographical prox-
imity of different households. Adding the
meso layer to an epidemiological model en-
ables researchers to represent a crucial part
of human interaction: social contacts out-
side the home or workplace. This includes
encountering others while shopping, and so-
cial gatherings of neighbors.
Variables in the executable model repre-
sent properties of the real population, but
many of them cannot be observed directly.
Therefore, the argument goes, a suitable
value for the executable must be determined
by experimenting with the simulator. In the
implementation phase, the CE strives to get
a handle on the parameter space, i.e. the
value space for all parameters that can be
subject to variation. To illustrate this, a
sample case is now considered.
To find a suitable value for the parame-
ter context contacts, representing the aver-
age number of contacts outside the home or
the workplace, the behavior of the simulated
outbreak is observed using the total number
of infected individuals per week for a large
interval of context contact values. The in-
terval is set to start from zero, where the
model behavior is undefined, to where the
parameter no longer has an observable im-
pact, i.e. when it is high enough to exhaust
the population regardless of all other pa-
rameters. Within the [8,20] interval, chang-
ing the context contacts parameter had, in
this example, a significant effect on the be-
havior of the model. Repeating the same se-
ries of experiments with a smaller step size
within the [8,20] interval, a smaller region
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of interest was obtained within the [14,16]
interval. Finally, the analysis was repeated
one last time for the [14,16] interval with a
smaller step size. Figure 2 shows the num-
ber of infections per week for five runs where
all parameters except context contacts were
kept constant. Further simulations were run
to observe the effects of variation due to
random seeds when contacts was set to 15.
Figure 3 shows the number of infections per
week for three runs with different random
seeds where all other parameters were kept
constant.
Other variables in the executable model
that should be decided using a similar pro-
cess include (but are not limited to): num-
ber of initially infected, office size, place
choice based on disease level, place choice
based on age, length of a work day, and the
probability of receiving a symptomatic dis-
ease profile.
2.3. Stochasticity
An outbreak of pandemic influenza is a
rare event. To trigger such an outbreak, ei-
ther the simulations must be run repeatedly
for a long period until an outbreak occurs,
or the model must be configured in such a
way that outbreaks will occur with higher
frequency than in the real world. The for-
mer is not practical since it might take mil-
lions of runs before anything happens, and
the latter comes with the risk of compro-
mising the validity of output by introducing
exogeneous variables that change the effects
of the simulated outbreak.
All random events in the model use a se-
ries of numbers that are generated at run-
time using the initial seeds provided by the
user. Therefore, the outcome of every “ran-
dom” event in a simulation run depends
only on the initial seeds. By using the same
seeds, identical results can be obtained us-
ing different computers, operating systems,
or compilers.
In the present model, one highly influen-
tial parameter is the number of initially in-
fected. When 50 randomly selected individ-
uals are infected, an outbreak is triggered in
nearly every run. If only three individuals
are selected instead, the outbreaks become
much more rare. This is due to the hetero-
geneity of the population: individuals with
more contacts are more likely to initiate
outbreaks if infected, and it is more likely
that a highly connected individual would be
infected if 50 rather than three are infected
initially.
It is often assumed in executable mod-
els that in a few generations, a simulation
with three infected would reach the stage
with 50 infected, and that the difference
between them would be negligible. Cer-
tainly every simulation with three initially
infected would reach a stage with 50 in-
fected, given that an outbreak occurs dur-
ing the run. Therefore simulations can be
started from the stage where 50 individu-
als are infected since that is the minimum
number at which the simulation platform
produces outbreaks in the majority of runs.
This assumption is far from ideal. The sim-
plest observable effect is that no runs will
have less than 50 infected. This is accept-
able because the object of study is nation-
wide outbreaks. However, the difference
between the two approaches is not negligi-
ble because 50 randomly selected individu-
als will not have the same geographical dis-
tribution as 50 individuals whose infections
originate from three individuals. The 50-
from-three group will most likely have over-
lapping social networks because they were
all infected by three individuals, as opposed
to being randomly selected from a popula-
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tion of nine million. As the outbreak grows
to one thousand or one hundred thousand
infected, the difference may lose its signifi-
cance, but quantifying that significance re-
mains challenging for all executable models
that use heterogeneous populations. Hence,
this is a good example of a simulation in
which the CE makes an assumption about
things beyond the PM’s control, or even
grasp. Good software development requires
that such assumptions be made explicit and
communicated to the PM.
3. Conclusion
The lessons learned from the software de-
velopment project described above can be
summarized in the form of a check list.
Even if the list is not exhaustive, devel-
opers of computational epidemiology mod-
els could check off the items on the list,
as applicable to their project. The pre-
sented workflow and checklist do not include
surveillance in computational epidemiology
and instead focus on modeling and sim-
ulation. A more comprehensive workflow
for computational epidemiology would have
to incorporate computer-assisted infectious
disease surveillance, often performed using
complex software platforms tailored to the
task [19, 20, 21, 22], and the interaction of
its users with the actors already identified
in the preceding sections.
Computational epidemiology is a new
area, and many of the methods and theo-
ries employed have yet to benefit from thor-
ough scientific investigation. Even if im-
portant steps towards amalgamating mod-
els and performing alignment experiments
have been taken (see, e.g., [23]), the area
is in need of extensive methodological ad-
vancement. The following checklist is in-
tended to be a contribution to such develop-
ment. Not every item in the check list intro-
duces new issues for policy makers or com-
putational epidemiologists, but, depending
on the reader’s area of expertise, one or two
are highly likely to be more significant than
the others. Much of it is part of the folk-
lore of the area, and could be classified as
procedural and pragmatic know-how. More
specifically, the contribution is to have these
items made explicit as one concise list, and
tied to working procedures as demonstrated
by our workflow description (Figure 1).
1. All population data sets are regional
To have access to data on the entire pop-
ulation on the planet is not a realistic goal.
Hence, most studies are limited to one geo-
graphic region, such as a city, a state, or a
country [24]. This means that the universe
of discourse includes not only the individu-
als in this geographic region, but also that
a certain proportion of the individuals must
be allowed to leave the region. Moreover,
visitors and immigrants from other regions
should be included in the population data.
Some computational epidemiology projects
employing micro data use census data, oth-
ers extrapolate from samples, and yet oth-
ers use synthetic data. In the rare cases
where registry data is available for a large
population—as is the case for the Swedish
population—hard methodological questions
must still be answered regarding the gener-
alizability of results: which parts of a sce-
nario execution in Sweden are likely to be
analogous to ones in Norway, Iceland, or the
state of Oregon?
2. Population data are sensitive
Even after extensive post-processing, any
data set with real population data is subject
to privacy and integrity concerns. In almost
all countries, this means that running a sim-
ulator with the data set is subject to apply-
ing to an ethics board. If approved, data
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must be kept safe and experiments may be
run in designated facilities only. This makes
replication studies difficult, and it also re-
stricts alignment studies to less interesting
data sets.
3. Verifying the simulator is a serious
engineering challenge
To formally verify that the simulator pro-
duces adequate results, is free from pro-
gramming bugs, and can handle the compu-
tational complexity of modeling large out-
breaks is, in general, not possible. The soft-
ware is too large, as is the variation of possi-
ble input values and the spectrum of sensi-
tivity analyses. Extensive testing—varying
the hardware environment and the param-
eter values, including the random seeds
for stochastic processes—yields evidence for
adequacy, but no guarantees. This does not
entail that the simulator is without use, or
not to be trusted, but merely that its con-
struction and maintenance is an engineering
challenge.
4. Validating the simulator output is hard
Pandemics have been few and far be-
tween. Modeling a future scenario on a
real outbreak of the past has been done
with some success in the area of epidemi-
ology. The structural properties of current
and future societies may vary greatly from
those studied in the past, however. Air
travel, hygiene, and working conditions are
three out of many factors that affect the
spread of communicable disease and that
vary greatly in the historical perspective.
The low probability of catastrophic events
such as a pandemic makes it very hard to
validate any simulation experiment against
real-world events.
5. Assumptions and hypotheses should be
stated and controlled by the policy maker
Placing assumptions on top of assump-
tions will only create a gap between the pol-
icy maker and the computational epidemi-
ologist. As illustrated by the example of
selecting different initially infected individ-
uals, the description of a single assumption
can be interpreted in multiple ways, and the
implementation of different interpretations
can diverge significantly from the respec-
tive intention. The complexity of commu-
nicating all assumptions implied by the de-
cisions of the policy maker arises from the
tremendous difficulty in identifying implicit
assumptions at every step of development.
Because every addition to the model carries
the risk of modifying the interaction of ex-
isting parameters, ensuring that all assump-
tions have been made by the policy maker
becomes a formidable challenge.
6. Triggering outbreaks in the simulator
is nontrivial
To implement a simulator that always
produces outbreaks is easy. Increasing the
infectiousness of a disease (as done, e.g.,
[17]) or the number of initially infected,
quickly yields a disease pattern affecting the
entire giant component, i.e. every individ-
ual connected to other individuals through
the social network or by geographical prox-
imity (cf. [25]), forming the largest con-
nected subgraph of the population graph
(cf. [26]). If such settings are inconsistent
with empirical data, or with assumptions
and hypotheses declared, however, then the
adequacy of the model should be ques-
tioned. There is evidence for the fact that
the initial stages of a pandemic require a
different kind of modeling than the later
stages [27]. It would therefore be na¨ıve to
think that increasing the number of initially
infected—in order to trigger outbreaks in a
larger proportion of runs—would not affect
the model of the entire pandemic.
7. Hybrid models need constant refine-
ment
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A model in which the micro, meso, and
macro properties are integrated has the po-
tential to mirror reality in a relatively accu-
rate way. Under the proviso that model ad-
equacy yields better prediction, one could
discard the simplest models in favour of
such hybrid models. The level of ambition,
however, comes at the price of the model
never being finished, and model-dependent
artifacts becoming more difficult to iden-
tify. Since the world to be modeled is a
moving target, and since macro data can of-
ten be replaced by micro data as it becomes
available, there are always refinements to be
made. The devil is in the details.
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Figures
Figure 1 - Executable model workflow
The schematic workflow of developing
and running an executable model, incor-
porating policy makers and computational
epidemiologists.
Figure 2 - Context contacts variation
Number of infections per week for five
runs where all parameters except context
contacts were kept constant.
Figure 3 - Random seed variation
Number of infections per week for three
runs with different random seeds where all
other parameters were kept constant. Each
random seed is a vector of numbers gener-
ated by a pseudo-random number genera-
tor.
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